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1 Introduction
The Federal Reserve took a variety of unconventional policy actions during the recent nancial
crisis that started in 2007. As traditional interest rate policy that adjusts the federal funds
rate was perceived to be ine¤ective (Cecchetti, 2009), the Fed adopted various measures of the
so-called unconventional monetary policy (see Reis, forthcoming, for a review). In addition
to injecting liquidity into the nancial system (Brunnermeier, 2009), some of the Feds policy
measures also had the avor of providing capital subsidy to banks, a point forcefully made
by Cecchetti (2009). During the crisis, lending by the Fed to banks almost always involved a
subsidy. By accepting collaterals at prices that were almost surely above their actual market
prices (Tett, 2008), lending by the Fed in e¤ect recapitalized the borrowing banks through
nominal transfers: On one hand, reserves and monetary base were created. On the other hand,
banks were getting more funds than they could get from the market for the same interest rates
and the same collaterals. In response to the crisis, the Fed attempted to stimulate discount
borrowing, which is collateralized, by reducing substantially the premium charged on primary
discount lending (relative to the federal funds rate target) and raising the term of lending from
overnight to as long as three months. In addition, to remove the stigma attached to discount
borrowing1, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007 and enlarged
it later on in order to better provide funds to banks that need them most. The rules of the TAF
allow banks to pledge collaterals that might otherwise have little market value.2 The quantity
of TAF lendings was large. In January 2009 they constituted more than one fth of the Feds
total assets.
1Traditionally, banks that borrowed from the discount window might be seen by other banks and institutions
as having nancial stress.
2For details, see Cecchetti (2009). Similar actions were taken by the Fed to help out other nancial institutions
(e.g., investment banks) through programs such as the Term Securities Lending Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, etc.
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In the light of the celebrated Modigliani-Miller theorem, such bank recapitalization e¤orts,
as short-run measures to cope with the adverse situation in the economy, would be impotent
in stimulating employment and output in a world where banks can frictionlessly raise funds to
nance the loans they make, as the capital structure of banks would be irrelevant for their lending
activities and the real market value of their loan portfolios. In that kind of world the classical
dichotomy holds and the recapitalization of banks by the monetary authority is neutral, despite
that it does involve a real transfer that enlarges banks net worth relative to debt (because
other sectors of the economy are not getting the same nominal transfer). However, as will
be demonstrated in this paper, once an agency cost problem is introduced to the relationship
between banks and their private-sector creditors (henceforth depositorsfor ease of exposition),
the Modigliani-Miller theorem fails for banks, the classical dichotomy breaks down, and money is
no longer neutral when the central bank policy takes the form of injecting money to the banking
system to increase bank capital. In particular, a bank recapitalization e¤ort by the monetary
authority triggers a redistribution of wealth (nominal and real) in favor of the banks, reduces
the cost of banksexternal nance, stimulates bank lending, and raises employment and output.
Importantly, this non-neutrality of money obtains even without any kind of nominal rigidities.
Needless to say, understanding the mechanism through which policy works is crucial for
assessing the e¤ectiveness of central bank reactions to the crisis. Impotent policy is clearly not
interesting. The main thrust of the paper is that to make sense of the bank recapitalization
policy, one has to take seriously frictions on the liability side of the bank balance sheet, i.e.,
frictions in the relationship between banks and depositors. The reason is that it is precisely
frictions on the liability side of the bank balance sheet, rather than frictions on the asset side,
that are responsible for the real e¤ects of the bank recapitalization policy. As is already well
known, on the asset side of the bank balance sheet there might exist informational asymmetry
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regarding the ability of (nonnancial) rms to repay their loans, giving rise to an agency cost
problem between banks and rms as emphasized in the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler
(1989) and a large literature that follows. Frictions of this kind are the literatures main focus
thus far. We shall refer to them as credit frictions, for the sake of distinguishing it from
the informational asymmetry and agency cost problem on the liability side of the bank balance
sheet, which we shall call banking frictions. To introduce the latter kind of frictions we apply
the costly-state-verication (CSV) framework of Towsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and
Williamson (1986) to the bank-depositor relationship. In our model banks face idiosyncratic risks
and depositors have to expend monitoring costs in order to verify bankscapacities to repay. As
is shown in the paper, bank recapitalization by the monetary authority is neutral when banking
frictions are absent, even if the conventionally studied credit frictions are present. This implies
that what credit frictions do is at best to amplify and propagate the policys real e¤ects which
are brought forth solely by the existence of banking frictions. We are thus compelled to give
special attention to the roles banking frictions play. Modeling banking frictions and studying
their implications for the e¤ects of bank recapitalization policy is precisely the goal of this paper.
In our model economy, banks receive both deposits and central bank money injections to
nance their lending activities. It should be claried here that we use the term deposits
in the broadest sense, referring to all liabilities of banks that are held by the private sector.
Meanwhile, we lump all the private-sector creditors of banks, including consumers, nonnancial
businesses, and nonbank nancial rms, into a single category of agents called depositors. At
the heart of our story is that the rate of default by banks and the cost of their external nance
are positively related to their debt-equity ratios. For any given amount of loan assets of banks,
recapitalization nanced by nominal transfers reduces their debt and increases their capital, and
thus lowers their debt-equity ratios, no matter how the price level changes. This reduction in
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banksnancial leverage is not inconsequential: It leads to declines in their default rates and
costs of external nance. This allows their loan assets to expand, which in turn stimulates the
economys employment and output.
To highlight the mechanism at work, our model has abstracted from several aspects of the
actual economy that might be considered important in other contexts. First, our analysis is
conducted within a framework that allows for perfect nominal exibility (i.e., there is no price
or wage stickiness or adjustment cost on nominal savings). This allows us to isolate the real
e¤ects of the recapitalization policy from the non-neutrality produced by nominal rigidities.
Second, insurance of deposits is not considered. This does not invalidate our analysis since a
large fraction of bank liabilities remain uninsured.3 Neither are capital adequacy requirements
incorporated. Hence the mechanism in our model does not work through the relaxation of
binding capital adequacy requirements. Instead, it works through changing the banksdefault
rate and their cost of external nance. Third, our model is constructed in such a way that the
rmsnancial leverage is una¤ected by the bank recapitalization policy in equilibrium, which
enables us to focus on the role played by the banks debt-equity ratio. Such a construct is
innocuous as neither the non-neutrality result with banking frictions nor the neutrality result
without banking frictions (but still with credit frictions) relies on the xity of the equilibrium
debt-equity ratio of rms.
In a model that allows for perfect nominal exibility, some other sort of frictions must be
employed to generate the non-neutrality of money. In Lucas(1972) misperceptions theory it is
the imperfect information about the overall price level that temporarily misleads suppliers and
generates real e¤ects of money supply shocks. It seems that information on money supply and
other policy instruments are available to the public with little delay so there is no serious signal
3For example, large time deposits (or certicates of deposits, CDs in short) are usually issued in $1 million
pieces and are well above the deposit insurance limit.
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extraction problem to solve. Hence the misperceptions story might not be particularly relevant
in our context. In contrast, this paper assumes full information on all aggregate variables but
uses a di¤erent kind of information problem to generate the non-neutrality of money. The
problem here concerns costly revelation of banksinformation to depositors, which leads to the
breakdown of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and gives rise to a nontrivial role for bankscapital
structure. Although the idea that the Modigliani-Miller theorem might not apply for banks have
been put forth by Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Stein (1998), our non-neutrality result with
perfect nominal exibility is novel.4
Although the focus of our paper is on the e¤ects of short-run recapitalization e¤orts, i.e.,
policy actions intended to counteract adverse shocks to the economy, a more general formula-
tion of the bank recapitalization policy is adopted in our analysis. We envision the policy as
comprising a long-run component and a short-run component. The crucial di¤erence between
them is that the long-run policy involves a tradeo¤ between nancial frictions and monetary
frictions. The former is a combination of banking frictions and credit frictions, while the latter
arises from the constraint that purchases of factor inputs must use cash. An increase in the
long-run component reduces the extent of nancial frictions while raising the risk-free nominal
interest rate and hence the extent of monetary frictions. Balancing the e¤ects of these two
frictions results in an optimal long-run recapitalization policy, which turns out to be positive
under reasonable parameterization of the model economy. In contrast, the short-run policy only
a¤ects the extent of nancial frictions and leaves monetary frictions intact. This property allows
the short-run policy to be used as a stabilization tool when the economy is subject to shocks to
4To be concrete, our model di¤ers from theirs in two major respects. First, we use the CSV framework to
model banking frictions, while Stein (1995) uses an adverse selection model, and Kashyap and Stein (1995) use a
reduced-form formulation. Second, they rely on exogenously imposed incomplete adjustment of the price level to
generate the non-neutrality of money, while our model assumes away all sorts of nominal rigidities.
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the level of the riskiness of banking, which gives rise to a short-run policy reaction function.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of two-sided nan-
cial contracting with idiosyncratic banking risks. A general equilibrium model with consump-
tion/saving and labor supply decisions on the part of households is then developed in Section
3. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium, presents the non-neutrality result, and discusses the
optimal long-run policy and the optimal short-run reaction function. The last section concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Financial Contracting with Banking Risks
2.1 Production and Information Structure
Consider an environment with a unit-mass continuum of regions indexed by i, i 2 [0; 1]. In region
i there is one bank, called bank i, and a unit-mass continuum of rms indexed by ij, j 2 [0; 1].
Each rm resides in a distinct location, and operates a stochastic production technology that
transforms labor and capital services into a homogeneous nal output. The technology of rm
ij is represented by the production function
yij = i!ijF (kij ; lij) ; (1)
where yij ; kij ; and lij denote nal output, capital input, and labor input, respectively, for rm
ij. The function F () is linearly homogeneous, increasing and concave in its two arguments,
and satises the usual Inada conditions. All sources of idiosyncratic risks are captured in the
productivity factor, with i being the random productivity specic to region i, and !ij the
random productivity specic to location ij. We assume that i is identical and independently
distributed across regions, with c.d.f. r () and p.d.f. r (), and that !ij is identical and
5The level of banking riskiness is represented by a dispersion parameter of the distribution of the idiosyncratic
bank productivities and is assumed to stochastic.
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independently distributed across all locations, with c.d.f. l () and p.d.f. l (). Both i and
!ij have non-negative support and unit mean. Furthermore, i and !j , i;  ; j 2 [0; 1], are
uncorrelated with each other. The distributions are known by all agents in the economy.
Firms hire labor and rent capital from competitive factor markets at nominal wage rate
W and rental rate Rk. Assume that each rm owns the same amount of physical capital Kf ,
and that each bank owns Kb. Both Kf and Kb are xed. To simplify matters even further
we assume that physical capital is not traded so that capital gains or losses (from changes in
the price of capital) are not potential sources of changes in the net worth of rms and banks.
Moreover, it cannot be transferred across di¤erent rms and banks. There is, however, a rental
market. And the rental income of capital constitutes the rms and banksinternal funds.6 Since
the rmsinternal funds are generated entirely from the current rental value of the capital stock
they own, in a market clearing equilibrium the rms must borrow additional funds to nance
their purchase of labor inputs supplied by workers plus rental services provided by the stock of
physical capital owned by the banks. Our model thus emphasizes working capital nancing as
in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). Once rms acquire factor inputs, production takes place,
and the region and location specic productivities realize. The nal output is sold at price P in
a competitive goods market.
We use the CSV approach of Towsend (1979), which is later adopted by Gale and Hell-
wig (1985) and Williamson (1986), to model nancial frictions and nancial contracting. It is
assumed that there is an informational asymmetry regarding borrowersex post revenues. In
particular, only borrowers themselves can costlessly observe their realized revenues, while lenders
have to expend a verication cost in order to observe the same object. In our environment only
rm ij can observe at no cost sfij  i!ij , and only bank i can observe i costlessly. For a bank to
6Note that the assumption of xed capital stock does not prevent it from generating variable internal funds,
because in the general equilibrium the rental rate responds to aggregate shocks.
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observe sfij (or !ij) and for a depositor to observe i, verication costs have to be incurred. Note
that by lending to a continuum of rms in a particular region each bank e¤ectively diversies
away all the rm/location specic risks. But the region specic risk is not diversiable, giving
rise to the possibility that a bank becomes insolvent when an adverse regional shock occurs.
Our model thus features potential bankruptcy of banks in addition to potential bankruptcy of
nonnancial rms. Note that even if the working capital loans are perfectly safe for the banks
(no default by the rms), the depositors still regard their claims on the banks as being risky due
to the informational asymmetry about the idiosyncratic bank/region productivities.
The concept of regions should not be interpreted literally as reecting geographic areas,
albeit this is certainly one of the many possible interpretations. Rather, it is a device designed
to generate risks idiosyncratic to individual banks. If banks are subject to risks that cannot be
fully diversied, then the kind of agency problem between banks and rms applies equally well
to the relationship between banks and depositors. In that case there are needs to monitor the
monitor, in the terminology of Krasa and Villamil (1992a). Bank-level risks might stem from
geographic connement of an individual banks operation to specic areas, as in the U.S. when
out-of-state branching was restricted (see Williamson, 1989). They might also be due to the
concentration of a banks lending activities in specic industries. Savings and loan associations
in the U.S., which historically concentrated on mortgage loans, was a good example. It should be
noted that even without branching restrictions or regulations on bankslending and investment
activities, an individual bank might optimally choose to limit its scale and/or scope of operation
so that the risks associated with its lending activities are not fully diversied. An example
appears in Krasa and Villamil (1992b), who consider the trade-o¤ involved in increasing the size
of a banks portfolio (i.e., lending to additional borrowers). In their model balancing the gains
from decreased default risk with the losses from increased monitoring costs leads to an optimal
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scale for banks. Another example is Cerasi and Daltung (2000), who introduce considerations
on the internal organization of banks that render scale economies in the banking sector rapidly
exhausted.7 In this paper we follow Krasa and Villamil (1992a) and Zeng (2007) to assume that
an individual bank cannot contract with a su¢ cient variety of borrowers so that the credit risks
are not perfectly diversiable.
2.2 The Two-Sided Debt Contract
The three groups of players rms, banks, and depositors in the model are connected via
a two-sided contract structure. Both sides of the contract, one between the rms and banks
and the other between the banks and depositors t into a generic framework we now develop.
Here attention is restricted to deterministic monitoring.8 It is also assumed that all contracting
parties are risk neutral. It then follows that the optimal contract between a generic borrower
and a generic lender takes the form of a standard debt contract, in Gale and Hellwig (1985)s
term.
Suppose that the borrowers revenue is given by V s, where V is a component freely observable
to the lender, and s  0 is a unit-mean risky component that is subject to informational
asymmetry, whereby the borrower can costlessly observe s while the lender has to expend a
verication cost in order to do so. The verication cost is assumed to be  times the borrowers
revenue, with  2 (0; 1). The c.d.f. of s, given by  (), is also common knowledge. The contract
species a set of realizations of s for which monitoring occurs, together with a payment schedule.
An incentive compatible contract must specify a xed payment for s in the non-monitoring set,
7Specically, loan o¢ cers, who are the ones actually making loans, have to be monitored by the banker.
8The assumption of deterministic monitoring is actually less restrictive than it appears. Krasa and Villamil
(2000) articulates a costly enforcement model that justies deterministic monitoring when commitment is limited
and enforcement is costly and imperfect. See also Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1994) on
deterministic versus stochastic monitoring.
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otherwise the borrower will always report the value of s for which the payment is lowest among
non-monitoring states. A standard debt contract with monitoring threshold s is an incentive
compatible contract with the following features: (i) the monitoring set is fsjs < sg, (ii) the xed
payment is V s for s 2 fsjs  sg, and (iii) the payment is V s for s 2 fsjs < sg. The standard
debt contract is particularly interesting because it resembles many nancial contracts in the
real world. It features xed payment for non-default states and state-contingent payment when
default occurs. Requiring the borrower to repay as much as possible in default states allows
the xed payment for non-default states to be minimized, thus minimizing the probability of
verication and thus the expected monitoring cost.
Under the standard debt contract, the borrower and the lender each obtains a share of the
expected revenue V . The borrower receives V   (s; ) where
  (s; ) 
Z 1
s
(s  s) d (s) , (2)
reecting the fact that with s above s; the borrower gives out the xed payment V s and keeps
the remaining, while with s below s, all revenues are conscated by the lender. The lender
receives V	(s; ) where
	(s; )  s [1   (s)] + (1  )
Z s
0
sd (s) . (3)
When s is larger than or equal to s, which occurs with probability 1  (s), the lender recoups
the xed proportion s of the expected revenue V . If s falls below s, the lender takes all of the
realized revenue while expending a verication cost which equals a fraction  of the revenue.
Note that
  (s; ) + 	 (s; ) = 1  
Z s
0
sd (s) < 1,
indicating that there is a direct deadweight loss 
R s
0 sd (s) due to costly monitoring. The
following assumption is imposed.
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Assumption 1. (a) The p.d.f  () is positive, bounded, and continuously di¤erentiable on
(0;1), and (b) s (s) = [1   (s)] is an increasing function of s.
Assumption 1(b), that s (s) = [1   (s)] is increasing in s, is weaker than the increas-
ing hazard assumption commonly made in the incentive contract literature, which requires
 (s) = [1   (s)] to be monotonically increasing in s. Yet the latter property is already sat-
ised by a fairly large class of distributions. It can be shown that for s > 0,
 0 (s; ) =   [1   (s)] < 0;
	0 (s; ) = 1   (s)  s (s) > 0; if s < s^,
and
 0 (s; ) + 	0 (s; ) =  s (s) < 0;
where the primes denote derivatives and s^ satises 1    (s^)   s^ (s^) = 0. We rule out the
possibility of credit rationing by requiring V	(s^; ) to be no less than the opportunity cost
of funds for the lender (see Williamson, 1986). Thus the domain of s we are interested in is
[0; s^) and 	0 (s; ) > 0 on this interval. It is interesting to note that changes in the monitoring
threshold (and hence the default probability) generate redistributions of the expected revenue
between the borrower and the lender. An increase in s reduces the share   received by the
borrower, while raising the share 	 received by the lender. The total e¤ect on the returns to the
two parties, however, is negative since the marginal increase in the lenders share is less than
the marginal increase in the borrowers share, reecting the additional monitoring cost born by
the lender at the margin. Furthermore,
lim
s!0
  (s; ) = 1, lim
s!0
	(s; ) = 0, lim
s!0
[  (s; ) + 	 (s; )] = 1,
lim
s!0
 0 (s; ) =  1, lim
s!0
	0 (s; ) = 1, lim
s!0

 0 (s; ) + 	0 (s; )

= 0,
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whenever the probability density  (s) is bounded as in Assumption 1(a). These limits indicate
that starting from a small default rate, where the borrower grabs virtually all of the revenues,
an increase in the monitoring threshold generates a nearly one-for-one transfer of returns from
the borrower to the lender without producing discernible e¤ects on the sum of returns (that is,
the marginal direct deadweight loss is practically zero).
We now apply this generic debt contract framework to the bank-rm relationship. The rms
revenue can be written as V f!, where V f  PF (k; l)  is freely observable to the bank, and
! is the risk that can be observed by the bank only with a cost.9 The contract between the
bank and the rm species a monitoring threshold, denoted by !, for the rm/location specic
productivity !. Conditional on the region specic productivity , the expected return to the
rm is then given by PF (k; l)  f
 
!; l

and the revenue of the bank from lending to the rms
in its region is PF (k; l) 	b
 
!; l

, where  f
 
!; l

and 	b
 
!; l

result from substituting 
!; l

for (s; ) in (2) and (3).10
The contracting problem between the bank and its depositors species a monitoring threshold
for the bank risk . To t this into the generic setup, write the banks revenue as V b, where
V b  PF (k; l)	b  !; l. Here ! the monitoring threshold in the bank-rm contract is freely
observable to both the bank and the depositors. Let  represent the monitoring threshold for
 in the bank-depositor contract. Then the expected return to the bank from the contract is
V b b
 
; r

and the expected return to the depositors is V b	d
 
; r

, where  b
 
; r

and
	d
 
; r

obtain from substituting
 
; r

for (s; ) in (2) and (3).
9From the banks perspective, monitoring xf  ! is equivalent to monitoring ! given its information in .
10By the law of large numbers, the revenue of the bank from lending to all of the rms in its region is the same
as the expected revenue from lending to one rm, the expectation taken over the distribution of ! and conditional
on .
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2.3 Optimal Competitive Contract
To motivate competitive banking assume that in principle a bank is allowed to operate beyond
its region. But that entails a xed cost. It follows that the bank in region i must o¤er to
the rms in that region nancial contracts that maximize the rmsexpected return such that
if bank j, j 6= i o¤ers the same contracts to the same rms the expected return earned by
bank j will equal the opportunity cost of its funds plus the cost of operating outside region j.
Otherwise bank j would o¤er alternative contracts with terms that are preferable to the rms
and make a prot itself. If the out-of-region operating cost goes to zero, then the limit case is
perfect competition for the banking industry, where each bank o¤ers contracts that maximize
the expected return to the rms in its region such that the bank itself at least earns the riskless
return on its funds. We focus on this limit situation and state formally the optimal competitive
contract as solving the following problem.
Problem 1.
max
k;l;!;;Nd
PF (k; l)  f

!; l

subject to
PF (k; l)	b

!; l

 b
 
; r
  RN b; (4)
PF (k; l)	b

!; l

	d
 
; r
  RNd; (5)
Rkk +Wl  Nf +N b +Nd, (6)
where R is the risk-free nominal rate of interest. Here PF (k; l)  f
 
!; l

is the expected return
to the rm, unconditional on . Inequality (4) is the individual rationality (IR) constraint for
the bank, which says that the bank must obtain at least what it can earn by investing all of its
capital (in the nancial sense) in riskless securities. The amount of the banks nancial capital
equals the rental value of the physical capital stock it owns plus the injection of capital from the
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central bank, Z. That is, N b  RkKb+Z. Inequality (5) is the IR constraint for the depositors,
which says that the contract guarantees a riskless return R on their deposits. Finally, inequality
(6) is the ow-of-funds constraint for the rms. The total bill for the rms factor inputs is
Rkk +Wl, which has to be covered by the internal funds of the rms themselves, Nf  RkKf ,
and bank loans that equal the sum of bank capital N b and deposits Nd. In Problem 1 Nf and
N b are taken as given.
Dene the debt-equity ratiosfor the bank and rms, denoted by b and f respectively, as
b  N
d
N b
, f  N
b +Nd
Nf
.
As shown in the Appendix, the solution to Problem 1 satises the following conditions:
Fk (k; l) = q
 
!; 

R
Rk
P
; (7)
Fl (k; l) = q
 
!; 

R
W
P
; (8)
	d
 
; r

 b
 
; r
 = b; (9)
q
 
!; 

	b

!; l
 h
 b
 
; r

+	d
 
; r
i
=
f
1 + f
; (10)
where
q
 
!; 
  ("	b !; l   f !; l 	b0  !; l
 f 0 (!; l)
#"
	d
 
; r
   b  ; r 	d0  ; r
 b0
 
; r
 #) 1 :
(11)
The factor q
 
!; 

> 1 whenever !;  > 0, and lim!;!0 q
 
!; 

= 1.
Conditions (7)-(10) capture the notion that monetary frictions and nancial frictions lead
to ine¢ cient use of resources. Equations (7) and (8) are the rst-order conditions for factor
demand. They state that capital and labor inputs are employed up to the points where their
marginal products equal real factor prices, times the gross nominal interest rate R, and times
14
an object labeled q which is determined by the terms of the nancial contract, with both R and
q larger than or equal to one. In the rst-best world productive e¢ ciency requires equating the
marginal product of factor inputs to their real prices. In our model, however, there are various
sources of frictions that prevent the economy from achieving the rst best.
The rst friction arises from the requirement that factor market transactions must use cash,
a friction we call monetary friction. A gross nominal interest rate that is strictly greater than
one creates wedges between the marginal products of factor inputs and their real prices, leading
to underemployment of factor inputs. The second and third sources of distortions, measured in
combination by the factor q
 
!; 

, which we shall call the nancial friction indicator, lie in the
agency cost problem between borrowers and lenders. If either ! > 0 or  > 0 (or both) then
q
 
!; 

is strictly greater than one. Here ! > 0 indicates a positive default rate by the rms
and reects the agency cost in the bank-rm relationship. This is what the existing literature
on credit market imperfections has typically focused on. On the other hand,  > 0 corresponds
to a positive rate of default by the banks (to the depositors) and reects the agency cost in
the bank-depositor relationship. These nancial frictions create additional wedges between the
marginal products of factor inputs and their real prices. The variable q
 
!; 

measures the
overall distortions caused by the conventionally studied credit frictions and the sort of banking
frictions we introduce. Again, the presence of nancial frictions leads to underemployment of
resources. The distinction between monetary frictions and nancial frictions is important. In the
general equilibrium model to be presented in the next section, the long-run recapitalization
policy will involve a tradeo¤ between these two kinds of frictions, represented by movements
of R and q in opposite directions, while the short-runrecapitalization policy impacts on the
economy only through its e¤ect on q.
Equations (9) and (10) reect the fact that the optimal competitive contract entails binding
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IR constraints for both the bank and the depositors. Essentially, the terms of contract dictate
a division of expected revenues between borrowers and lenders. Equation (9) says that in the
bank-depositor contract the share of expected revenue received by the depositors, relative to
the share received by the bank, is positively related to the banks debt-equity ratio. Since
	d
 
; r

= b
 
; r

is increasing in , the banks default probability increases along with 
when it has a larger debt-equity ratio b. Equation (10) says that the total share of expected
revenue that goes to the bank and the depositors, adjusted for the factor q
 
!; 

, is positively
related to the rmsdebt-equity ratio f .
3 General Equilibrium
We now embed the two-sided nancial contract articulated in the previous section to a full-blown
general equilibrium model. The goal is to analyze how a bank recapitalization policy, taking the
form of central bank money injection into the banking system, will a¤ect the economy.
3.1 The Environment
Time is discrete and there is a representative household. Following Lucas (1990), we model the
household as a multi-member family. The household is populated with a unit-mass continuum
of members. Each member has the same utility function, dened over consumption and leisure
streams. They work to earn wage income in the labor market, and are also engaged in nancial
transactions with the banks, thereby playing the roles of depositorsas described in the previous
section. We assume that each member has the same amount of deposits. At the end of each
period all members reconvene and submit all of their income to the household. Note that di¤erent
members might have di¤erent amounts of income to bring to the household, depending on the
realizations of the idiosyncratic risks of the banks they contracted with. Since the household,
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through its members, contracts with all the banks in the economy, it e¤ectively holds a perfectly
diversied (with respect to ) portfolio of deposits. Thus the households total income is not
exposed to idiosyncratic bank risks: the total return on all deposits always equals the expected
return on each individual members deposits by the law of large numbers.11 This income pooling
assumption enables us to envision a perfect risk-sharing allocation designed by the household
that assigns equal amounts of consumption (and leisure) to its members, which e¤ectively renders
each member risk neutral with respect to the banking risk . This justies our treatment of
the depositors as being risk neutral in the nancial contracting problem. We also assume that
the rms and banks do not retain earnings in order to invest in consecutive periods, so that the
nancial contracting problem is of period-by-period nature and is as formulated in Problem 1.
Suppose that an individual household member has preferences represented by the following
life-time utility function:
E0
1X
t=0
t [log (Ct) +  log (1  Lt)] ; (12)
where Ct is consumption in period t, Lt is hours worked (the time endowment is normalized to
be one),  > 0 is a constant that weighs leisure relative to consumption,  2 (0; 1) is the time
discount factor, and E0 is the expectation operator conditional on time-0 information.12 The
assumption of perfect risk sharing against bank risks implies that for the purpose of character-
izing the behavior of aggregate variables it su¢ ces to consider consumption, leisure, and saving
(in the form of bank deposits) as being chosen by the household who maximizes (12), where the
expectation is taken over the distribution of aggregate shocks conditional on time-0 aggregate
information.13
11Note that the household, as the owner of all the banks and rms in the economy, also receives all the prot.
Again, by the law of large numbers, the total prot it receives from all the banks (rms) always equals the
expected prot from each individual bank (rm).
12The assumption that the period utility is logarithmic and separable in consumption and leisure allows us to
arrive at an analytical characterization of the equilibrium of the model economy.
13The household members do not bear the consequences of bank risks but still have to bear the consequences
17
LetMt denote the quantity of money outstanding at the beginning of period t. In equilibrium
this is all held by the household. In period t the central bank injects Zt  Mt+1  Mt into the
economy by means of nominal transfers to the banking system, which e¤ectively recapitalizes
the banks. Every bank receives the same amount of transfer. The quantity of money injection
is public information so that the model assumes full information on aggregate variables. In the
sequel we normalize all nominal quantities and prices byMt, following the practice of Christiano
(1991) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). The resultant variables will be denoted by
corresponding lowercase letters. Let zt  Zt=Mt be the recapitalization rate. We model zt as
consisting of two components a long-run component, represented by the constant   0, and
a short-run component, denoted by xt. That is
zt =  + xt: (13)
Here xt    so that zt is always nonnegative. Furthermore, xt is assumed to be a mean
zero, i.i.d. stochastic process. The i.i.d. assumption prevents the anticipated ination e¤ect
of a short-run increase in money growth from arising (see Christiano, 1991 and Williamson,
2005 for an exposition). The short-run component should be thought of as adjustment of the
recapitalization policy around the long-run component. For the present we treat both  and
xt as exogenous. Later on we will study how they might react to variations in the extent of
banking frictions.
After observing the value of zt, the household chooses its portfolio by dividing the nominal
balance mt between savings ndt , to be deposited in the banks, and cash holdings mt   ndt (these
quantities obtain after normalization by Mt). We assume that there is always a zero supply of
risk-free government bonds, so that in equilibrium all of the households savings are in the form
of deposits in the banks. Nevertheless, the zero-supply risk-free bonds can still be priced (at
of aggregate shocks, such as policy shocks or banking riskiness shocks, which are not diversiable.
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1=Rt). The bank-depositor contracts ensure that the risk-free return Rt accrues to household
deposits ndt . Contrary to the limited participation literature, we assume that there is no cost
or other barrier for the household to adjust its nominal savings in response to realizations of
xt. Hence our model also abstracts away the liquidity e¤ectof a short-run increase in money
growth. Removal of both the anticipated ination e¤ect and the liquidity e¤ect makes the risk-
free nominal interest rate unresponsive to xt, which greatly simplies the analysis of the e¤ects
of the short-run recapitalization policy.
There is a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint, standard in the literature, on the households
purchase of consumption:
ptCt  mt   ndt + wtLt; (14)
where pt  Pt=Mt is the scaled price level. This formulation is consistent with our previous
assumption that rms must acquire cash to purchase labor inputs (from workers). Implicit in
(14) is the notion that the wage income can be used to purchase consumption, along with the
cash balance the household set aside at the beginning of period t. Formulation like this allows
us to derive a standard quantity equation of money (see the next section). The households cash
holdings evolve according to
mt+1 (1 + zt) =

mt   ndt + wtLt   ptCt

+Rtn
d
t + t; (15)
where the term in the parentheses on the right-hand side is the unspent cash in the goods
market, Rtndt is the gross return on deposits, and t is the total prot of banks and rms, paid
out to the household in accordance with its ownership.14
The household maximizes (12) subject to (14) and (15). Its optimal plan obeys the following
14The household takes t as given. But in equilibrium t = ptF (Kt; Lt)

 f
 
!t;
l

+	b
 
!t;
l

 b
 
t;
r

.
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conditions:
Ct
1  Lt =
wt
pt
; (16)
Et

1
ptCt
   Rt
pt+1Ct+1 (1 + zt)

= 0; (17)
where Et is the expectation operator conditional on time-t aggregate information. Equation
(16) is the rst-order condition for labor supply, while equation (17) is the standard consump-
tion/saving Euler equation, modied to the current monetary environment.
Finally, we assume that the production function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form:
F (K;L) = KL1 ,  2 (0; 1) ,
where we have used K and L to replace k and l in (1) in anticipation of factor-market clearing.
3.2 Competitive Equilibrium Dened
We now dene a competitive equilibrium for our model economy with banking frictions and
two-sided nancial contracting.
Denition 1. A competitive equilibrium of the model economy is a policy fztg1t=0, an
allocation

Ct; ;mt+1; n
d
t ;K; Lt
	1
t=0
, a price system

pt; wt; r
k
t ; Rt
	1
t=0
, and terms of nancial
contract

!t; t
	1
t=0
such that
i. Given the policy and prices,

Ct; ;mt+1; n
d
t ; Lt
	1
t=0
solves the households problem and
satises (16)-(17). The CIA constraint (14) holds with equality whenever Rt > 1.
ii. Given the policy and prices,

K;Lt; !t; t
	1
t=0
solves the nancial contracting problem
(Problem 1) and satises (7)-(10).
iii. The money market, loan market, and goods market clear. That is, mt = 1 in addition to
wtLt = n
d
t + zt; (18)
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Ct = F (K;Lt)'
 
!t; t

; (19)
where
'
 
!t; t
   f !t; l+	b !t; l h b  t; r+	d  t; ri : (20)
iv. Rt  1 for all time.
In the goods-market clearing condition (19), the factor '
 
!t; t

< 1 whenever !t > 0, or
t > 0, or both, reecting the direct deadweight loss due to the agency cost problems.15 We call
' the net output factor since it gives the proportion of the gross output that is not dissipated
in the agency process. The loan market clearing condition takes the form of (18) because the
rmsrental payment on capital is covered by the rental value of the stock of capital owned by
the rms and banks. It remains that their wage bills are to be ultimately nanced by household
deposits and the monetary authoritys transfers to the banks.16
For analytic purpose it will be especially convenient to look at the behavior of the model
economy around a situation where no default by either the banks or the rms occurs. We dene
such a situation as follows.
Denition 2. A zero-default equilibrium is the competitive equilibrium of the model econ-
omy obtained when the distributions for  and ! are degenerate.
Essentially, the asymmetric information problems disappear when  and ! are non-stochastic,
giving rise to zero default in equilibrium. Proof of the existence and uniqueness of the zero-
default equilibrium is trivial. Our analysis will focus on the neighborhood of the zero-default
equilibrium where the default rates are small. According to Fisher (1999), the historical average
15Remember that there is also an indirect social loss due to the distortions on the marginal costs of production
caused by q > 1.
16To write the loan market clearing condition in full, we have rktK+wtLt = n
f
t+n
b
t+n
d
t = r
k
t
 
Kf +Kb

+ndt+zt.
This simplies to (18) since K = Kf +Kb.
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of bankruptcy rate is indeed quite small. Using the Dun & Bradstreet dataset, he nds an
average quarterly bankruptcy rate of roughly one percent for nonnancial rms. This does
not, however, mean that the distortions caused by nancial frictions are negligible. In fact,
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) show that a similar magnitude of bankruptcy rate is
consistent with an average external nance premium, or risk spread, of about two hundred basis
points per annum.17 Therefore the focus of our analysis in the neighborhood of the zero-default
equilibrium does not entail a large deviation from the reality.
4 The E¤ects of Bank Recapitalization
4.1 Characterization of Equilibrium
As the policy process zt is assumed to be stationary, the equilibrium allocation, prices, and
contract terms in period t are functions of zt, the functions being invariant with respect to t.
Hence the time subscripts will be dropped in the subsequent analysis whenever possible. To
avoid confusion, denote the random policy variable by z and its realization by z. Similarly,
denote the random short-run component of the policy by x and its realization by x. Given
the constant long-run component , we have z =  + x and z =  + x. Below we develop an
algorithm to solve for the equilibrium. In preparation we note the following.
First, the loan market clearing condition (18) together with the binding CIA constraint (14)
imply the quantity equation:
pC = 1 + z: (21)
Second, the risk-free nominal interest rate R is constant for given . Substitution of the
17 In Bernanke et al. (1999), the empirical measure of the risk spread is taken to be the di¤erence between the
prime lending rate and the six-month T-bill rate.
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quantity equation (21) into the Euler equation (17) gives
R =

E

1
1 + z
 1
; (22)
where E () denotes unconditional expectation. The i.i.d. assumption on xt implies that R is
independent of the realized value of the short-run policy..
Third, the debt-equity ratio of rms is constant:
f  n
b + nd
nf
=
 
rkKb + z

+ (wL  z)
rkKf
=
Kb
Kf
+
wL
rkK
K
Kf
=
Kb
Kf
+
1  

K
Kf
: (23)
The last equality follows from the Cobb-Douglas form of technology.
Fourth, the debt-equity ratio of banks is given by
b  n
d
nb
=
wL  z
rkKb + z
: (24)
Absent the term z, b is also a constant, given by (1  )K=  Kb. Hence by construction our
model features a debt-equity ratio of rms that is una¤ected by the bank recapitalization policy,
along with a debt-equity ratio of banks that can be perturbed by the policy. This feature allows
us to highlight the bank capital/liability side of the story.
Fifth, the bank debt-equity ratio b is a su¢ cient statistic for the monitoring thresholds 
!; 

and hence the nancial friction indicator q as well as the net output factor '. The
dependence of q on b is a central relationship in our analysis as it highlights the impact of
changes in the bankscapital structure on the extent of nancial frictions. The following lemma
states that an increase in b leads to a larger value of q in the neighborhood of zero-default. The
increase in q would reduce labor demand, ceteris paribus. However, the increase in b might
also lead to an increase in the direct deadweight loss and hence a decrease in ', which in turn
would produce a positive impact on labor supply due to a wealth e¤ect. It turns out that the
positive e¤ect on q dominates the potentially negative e¤ect on ' as long as the default rates are
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su¢ ciently small. The reason is that under such situations changes in ' are only of second-order
importance compared to changes in q. This justies the focus of our analysis on q.
Lemma 1. dq=db > 0 and d (q') =db > 0 whenever
 
!; 
 2 (0; !^)  0; ^ for some
!^; ^ > 0.
A subtlety arises when the nominal capital transfer z is so large that it exceeds wL. Note
that in this case b should be set to be zero, meaning that the banks have zero debt-equity ratio,
as they do not have to take in any debt. We assume that any excess of z over wL is rebated
to the household immediately. For all situations where z > wL the monitoring threshold in the
bank-depositor contract is kept at zero, i.e.,  = 0, and any amount of nominal capital transfer
beyond what is necessary to maintain a zero debt-equity ratio for the banks will not mitigate
banking frictions any further.18
Our strategy of solving for the equilibrium is to collapse all the equilibrium conditions into
one single equation as follows:
(1  )

K
L

= q
 
!; 

'
 
!; 

R
KL1 
1  L ;
Essentially, this equation characterizes equilibrium in the labor market, taking into account
all the relevant information from the rest of the economy: it is obtained by using the labor
supply condition (16) to substitute C= (1  L) for w=p in the labor demand condition (8), and
by further substituting KL1 '
 
!; 

for C in accordance with the resource constraint (19).
Obviously this condition can be further simplied to
1  L
L
=

1  Rq
 
!; 

'
 
!; 

: (25)
18To incorporate the case of z > wL, the following conditions should be modied. First, the loan market
clearing condition (18) becomes nd = max fwL  z; 0g. The CIA constraint (14) should be modied to pC 
m   nd + wL + max f0; z   wLg, reecting the fact that any excess of z over wL is rebated to the household
immediately. The evolution of household cash holdings (15) should be modied accordingly. Note that the
modied loan market clearing condition and the equality version of the modied CIA constraint implies the same
quantity equation as in (21).
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The left-hand side of (25) is a decreasing function of L. In general the right-hand side is also
a function of L (and the policy variable z as well), which we now derive in the following steps.
First, by substituting the quantity equation (21) into the labor supply condition (16) we have
w = 
1 + z
1  L: (26)
Second, dividing (7) by (8) yields rk=w = (L) = [(1  )K], which implies
rk =

1  

K
(1 + z)
L
1  L: (27)
Third, substitution of (26) and (27) into (24) gives
b =
L
1 L   z1+z

1 
Kb
K
L
1 L +
z
1+z
(28)
for L  zz+(1+z) (i.e., wL  z). For L < zz+(1+z) we set b = 0. Finally, solve for ! and
 given b using (9)-(10). This also allows us to compute q
 
!; 

and '
 
!; 

as functions of
b, and hence as functions of L (and z). The following proposition concerns the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In the neighborhood of the zero-default equilibrium, a competitive equi-
librium of the model economy with banking frictions and two-sided nancial contracting exists
and is unique.
A unique competitive equilibrium of the model economy exists if and only if a unique solution
to condition (25) exists for all z  0. Figure 1 illustrates the determination of L for given z.
As shown in the gure the left-hand side (LHS) of condition (25) is a monotonically decreasing
function of L, with limL!0 (1  L) =L =1 and limL!1 (1  L) =L = 0. For the right-hand side
(RHS) both z and R, the latter solely determined by the distribution of z and independent
of particular values of z, are taken as given. To see how RHS depends on L, we consider
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two intervals separately. First, for L 2

z
z+(1+z) ; 1
i
, the bank debt-equity ratio b > 0 since
wL =  (1 + z) L1 L > z. It can be shown that 
b is a monotonic function of L on this interval:
it is increasing in L for z > 0 and constant for z = 0. We already know from Lemma 1
that the factor q' is monotonically increasing in b in the neighborhood of the zero-default
equilibrium. Taken together, RHS is a monotonic, positive, nite-valued, continuous function of
L on

z
z+(1+z) ; 1
i
. Second, for L 2
h
0; zz+(1+z)
i
we have b = 0 since wL =  (1 + z) L1 L  z.
This implies that RHS is constant with respect to L on this interval, its value being equal to

1 Rq
 
!; 

'
 
!; 

=0
, where ! is given by (10) with  = 0. This is also the limit of RHS
as L tends to zz+(1+z) (meaning that 
b and  both tend to 0) from the right. Hence RHS is a
non-increasing, positive, nite-valued, continuous function of L on [0; 1].
For z = 0 RHS is a horizontal line, as shown in Figure 1. For z > 0 there is kink at
L = zz+(1+z) 2 (0; 1). To the left of the kink RHS is a horizontal segment. To the right it is
upward-sloping. The kink tends to zero as z tends to zero, and tends to 1= (1 + v) 2 (0; 1) as z
tends to innity. Several RHS curves are shown in Figure 1, corresponding to di¤erent values
of z. Note that the curves with z > 0 di¤er from the one with z = 0 in that the value of RHS
at L = 0 corresponds to b = 1 
K
Kb
when z = 0, but corresponds to b = 0 when z > 0. This
is because whenever z > 0, it exceeds wL at L = 0, no matter how small z is. Whether z = 0
or z > 0, the RHS curves cut LHS from below. Hence the solution to condition (25) exists,
is unique, and is interior for all z  0, implying that a competitive equilibrium with banking
frictions exists and is unique in the neighborhood of the zero-default equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
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4.2 The Non-Neutrality of Money
We are now ready to analyze the e¤ects of the bank recapitalization policy. We rst present an
analytical characterization of the e¤ects of the short-run policy.
Proposition 2. Take the long-run policy  as given and consider the neighborhood of the
zero-default equilibrium. There exists x^ 2 ( ;1) such that a marginal increase in x raises
employment, output, and consumption as long as x < x^. For x  x^ a marginal increase in x has
no real e¤ect. The cuto¤ x^ satises
1 +  + x^
 + x^
=
Rq (!; 0)' (!; 0)
1   ; (29)
where R is given by (22) and ! is given by (10), with  = 0 and f = K
b
Kf
+ 1 
K
Kf
.
To understand the result in Proposition 2, refer again to Figure 1. Consider rst the starting
situation where z > 0 (x >  ). Recall that for given z, the kink of RHS of condition (25)
occurs at L = zz+(1+z) . At this point the value of RHS equals

1 Rq (!; 0)' (!; 0), where ! is
given by (10) with  = 0. At the same L the value of LHS equals  1+zz . Given , x^ is the value
of x such that LHS and RHS of condition (25) intersect at exactly the kink. Such x^ exists, is
unique and nite, and is such that z^   + x^ is positive. If x < x^ then the equilibrium L is to
the right of the kink. In this case a marginal increase in x lowers the bank debt-equity ratio
b and lowers RHS, resulting in a higher equilibrium value of L. Since in the neighborhood of
the zero-default equilibrium changes in ' are only of second-order importance as compared to
changes in q (and hence L), consumption C = F (K;L)' will also increase in response to the
marginal increase in z. If on the other hand x  x^ then the equilibrium L is at the kink or to the
left. In this case a marginal increase in x has no e¤ect on b, which is already zero, and hence
does not have any real e¤ect at all. Analysis of the situation where we start from z = 0 (x =  )
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is straightforward. Under this situation the equilibrium L 2 (0; 1) and a marginal increase in z
lowers b and RHS, and hence the equilibrium values of L and C. Obviously this falls into the
case of x < x^. Proposition 2 thus implies that starting from the zero-recapitalization benchmark,
a short-run nominal capital injection into the banks is non-neutral.
It is important to note that the neutrality result for x  x^ does not mean that the Modigliani-
Miller theorem applies for the banks. Rather, the bankscapital structure still matters. It is
just that large values of x allow the banks to be one hundred percent internally nanced, which
lead to a zero bank debt-equity ratio and a zero monitoring threshold in the bank-depositor
contract. For x < x^, the non-neutrality result we state in Proposition 2 depends crucially on
the presence of banking frictions, i.e., frictions on the liability side of the bank balance sheet
due to the informational asymmetry in the bank-depositor relationship. Without such frictions,
a neutrality result will obtain regardless of the value of x.19 The result holds even with the
presence of credit frictions, i.e., frictions on the asset side of the bank balance sheet due to the
informational asymmetry in the bank-rm relationship. It is therefore precisely the presence
of banking frictions (and the fact that banks are the institutions being recapitalized) that is
responsible for the potency of the recapitalization policy.
Characterizing the e¤ects of the long-run recapitalization policy is much more complicated.
The intuition, however, is quite simple. Basically, two opposing forces are at work when the
long-run policy  changes. First, holding the risk-free nominal interest rate R xed, an increase
in  has similar e¤ects as an increase in x, including a drop in the nancial friction indicator
q. Second, holding the extent of nancial frictions xed, an increase in  raises R for any
given distribution of the short-run policy x. Reected in Figure 1, the former would shift
19To see this we can take away banking frictions from the model simply by assuming that the distribution of
the region specic productivity is degenerate. It is straightforward to show that in such an environment changes
in the short-run recapitalization policy are irrelevant for employment, output, consumption, real factor prices,
and the rmsdefault rate.
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RHS of condition (25) down, while the latter would shift it up. Hence changes in the long-run
recapitalization policy involve tradeo¤s between nancial frictions, as represented by q, and
monetary frictions, as represented by R. Spelling out the exact conditions under which one
of these two forces dominates is di¢ cult, if possible at all. We therefore resort to numerical
experiments in the next subsection.
4.3 Banking Riskiness and the Optimal Recapitalization Policy
Our analysis thus far has treated the bank recapitalization policy as being exogenous. Conditions
under which such policy is potent were established. In this section we investigate how the policy
can be used in an optimal fashion when there are shocks to the riskiness of banking. To
introduce the concept of banking riskiness, we assume that the bank/region specic productivity
 follows a unit-mean log-normal distribution on (0;1), i.e., log ()  N   122; 2, where N
stands for the normal distribution. The distribution is completed by assigning a zero p.d.f.
for  = 0. In our model, it is the costly verication of  that gives rise to the bankruptcy of
banks. The default rate of banks tends to zero as  tends to zero from the right. Therefore the
dispersion parameter  captures the extent of the riskiness of banking. Here we allow  to be
random. Specically, its time-t value is
;t = 
s
 + "t; (30)
where s, representing the steady-state level of riskiness, is a positive constant, and "t is an i.i.d.
disturbance, with "t >  s for all t. We interpret "t as the banking riskiness shock.20
In our view, shocks to banking riskiness are highly relevant in the light of the erratic behavior
of the risk spreads for banksexternal nance. The historical average of the spread between the
20Our formulation of riskiness and the riskiness shocks parallels Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2005, 2009),
who consider the costly state verication problem between nancial intermediaries and nonnancial rms.
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3-month CD rate and the 3-month T-bill rate is about 0:75 percent per annum, based on a sample
period from 1973Q1 to 2009Q4. From 2001Q1 to 2007Q2, the spread averages only 0:27 percent
per annum. In contrast, its average in the second half of 2007 and the year of 2008 rises to as high
as 1:53 percent per annum, with a hike at 2:52 percent per annum in the fourth quarter of 2008.
In our model, there is a direct linkage between the level of banking riskiness and the external
nance premium faced by the banks. The gross interest rate at which the banks borrow from the
depositors is simply the non-default payment specied in the bank-depositor contract divided
by the amount of deposits, i.e., Rb = pF (K;L)	b
 
!; l

=nd. Using the binding IR constraint
for the depositors (5), we obtain the models bank risk spread: Rb R = R =	d  ; r  1.21
Other things equal, an increase in  raises  and hence the bank risk spread.22 Fluctuations in
the banking riskiness thus give rise to uctuations in the bank risk spread.
It is easy to see that when the policy zt and the banking riskiness ;t are as specied in (13)
and (30), the existence and uniqueness results for the competitive equilibrium, as established
in Proposition 1, remain valid.23 Proposition 2, which establishes the e¤ectiveness, to a certain
extent, of the short-run recapitalization policy, applies as well. Importantly, the potency of the
short-run policy allows it to become a stabilization tool in the face of banking riskiness shocks.
Taking the long-run policy  and the steady-state riskiness s as given, we aim to analyze how
the short-run policy xt can be used to bu¤er the economy from the disturbance "t to the level
of banking riskiness. We shall see that stabilization considerations give rise to a particular kind
of short-run policy reaction function, or policy rule, which dictates how xt should respond to "t
in a systematic fashion. Endogenizing xt to be a function of "t also retains the i.i.d. nature of
21Similarly, the risk spread faced by the rms in the model is given by Rf   R =
R

!=

	b
 
!; l
  
 b
 
; r

+	d
 
; r
  1	.
22Note that Rb  R is increasing in  since 	d0 < 1.
23Essentially, the models equilibrium is of period-by-period nature, aside from the intertemporal linkage as
represented by R, which is solely determined by the time-invariant distribution of zt.
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xt as in the specication of (13).
Ideally, the policy should completely insulate employment Lt and consumption Ct from the
disturbances. But from (19) and (25), this would require the nancial friction indicator qt and
the net output factor 't to be completely stabilized. This is impossible since we would have
two targets and only one policy instrument. However, as we emphasized earlier, compared to
qt the variable 't is only of second-order importance in the neighborhood of the zero-default
equilibrium. Hence, an approximately optimal policy needs only seek to stabilize the nancial
friction indicator qt. Our numerical result, to be presented momentarily, shows that targeting qt
alone actually achieves near-complete stabilization of both qt and 't and hence near-complete
stabilization of Lt and Ct.
Since complete stabilization can be approximately obtained, the recapitalization policy can
be made to nearly x employment and consumption over time. The question is what values
of L and C and the associated q are optimal from the welfare point of view. This amounts to
nding the optimal value of the long-run policy , i.e., the value of  that maximizes steady-
state household utility. As we argued previously, changes in the long-run policy entail tradeo¤s
between distortions caused by monetary frictions and distortions caused by nancial frictions.
Roughly speaking, the marginal e¤ect of  on the risk-free nominal interest rate R, which
captures the extent of monetary frictions, is given by 1=.24 On the other hand, the steady-
state marginal e¤ect of  on the nancial friction indicator q depends on the average level of
banking riskiness, as represented by s. The optimal long-run policy thus balances the marginal
e¤ects of the two distortions, and is naturally a function of s. Denote the optimal long-run
recapitalization policy by , and the value of q associated with  by q. For the short-run
recapitalization policy, q serves as the target.
24Strictly speaking, R depends not only on  but also on the distribution of xt (see (22)). However, as long as
the dispersion of xt is not large, R = (1 + ) = holds approximately.
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In order to derive the approximately optimal reaction function for the short-run policy,
denote the mapping of
 
"t; 
b
t

to qt by q
 
"t; 
b
t

: the realization of "t gives the value of ;t,
which, together with the bank debt-equity ratio bt , determines
 
!t; t

and hence qt through
(9) and (10). Given "t, targeting qt at q amounts to targeting bt at 
b
t , where 
b
t is such that
q
 
"t; 
b
t

= q. Let L, w, and r be the values of L, w, and r that correspond to the optimal
long-run policy . Then according to (24), the optimal time-t short-run policy, denoted by xt ,
satises
bt =
wL   ( + xt )
rKb + ( + xt )
;
which leads to the optimal reaction function:
xt =
wL
1 + bt
  
b
t r
Kb
1 + bt
  .
To target q, an increase in "t requires a lower value of bt . But a reduction in 
b
t calls for an
increase in xt . Hence xt varies positively with "t, with xt = 0 when "t = 0. Such a reaction
function entails recapitalization e¤orts that counteract banking riskiness: there is more (less)
nominal capital transfer to the banks when banking becomes more (less) risky.25
To demonstrate numerically the optimal setting of the long-run policy and the short-run
reaction function, we calibrate the model economy as follows. Let a time period correspond to
a quarter, and consider a no-recapitalization benchmark. We set  = 0:99 to match an annual
risk-free real interest rate of 4%. The weight on leisure in the household utility function, , is
chosen to deliver L = 1=3 absent shocks. The elasticity parameter in the production function,
, is set to be 1=2, implying an asset-net worth ratio of about 2 for the rms (see Bernanke et
al.).26 With the aggregate capital stock K being normalized to one, the banksshare of capital,
25Note that the above analysis implicitly assumes that the maximum value of xt (corresponding to the maximum
value of "t) does not exceed the value of x^ associated with  as dened in (29). This will be true if "t is not too
large.
26 If the variable K in the production function were interpreted literally as physical capital, then 1=2 would
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Kb, equals 0:082, which is consistent with the historical average of an asset-net worth ratio of
13:18 for U.S. commercial banks.27 The monitoring cost parameter, , is set to be 0:3.28 Similar
to the bank/region specic productivity, we assume that the rm/location specic productivity
! follows a unit-mean log-normal distribution on (0;1), completed with the assignment of a
zero p.d.f. for ! = 0. For ! > 0, log (!)  N   122!; 2!. We assume that ! is xed, while
;t follows the specication in (30). The value of ! and the steady-state value of ;t, i.e., s,
are chosen to match (1) a spread between the rmsborrowing rate and the risk-free rate of 2:93
percent per annum, and (2) a spread between the banksborrowing rate and the risk-free rate
of 0:75 percent per annum.29
Figure 2 depicts the optimal recapitalization policy in relation to the level of banking risk-
iness. Panel (a) pertains to the long-run policy. The left part illustrates the tradeo¤ between
R and q as induced by changes in , with s set to be 0:031, the calibrated steady-state value
of ;t. An increase in  raises the risk-free nominal interest rate R while lowering the nancial
friction indicator q. Under our parameterization, the utility maximizing value of the long-run
policy, denoted by , occurs at 1:14%, which corresponds to an annual money growth of 4:64%.
The optimal long-run policy  varies as s changes. The right part of Panel (a) shows that 

is an increasing, approximately linear function of s. An increase in the steady-state level of
banking riskiness gives more weight to the mitigation of banking frictions and results in a higher
value of . As long as s is greater than 0:023, long-run considerations call for positive values
be too large a value for . Nevertheless, a broader interpretation can be adopted: the variable might be thought
to include bank and rm managershuman capital, e.g., managerial skills, as well.
27This calculation is based on Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United Statesof the Federal
Reserve. The sample period is 1973Q1-2009Q4.
28Altman (1984) estimates the sum of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs to be about 20 percent of rms
total asset. By comparing the value of a rm as a going concern with its liquidation value, Alderson and Betker
(1995) estimate that liquidation costs are equal to approximately 36 percent of rms assets. The value we adopt
for the bankruptcy cost parameter lies in between these two estimates.
29The empirical measures of the risk-free rate, the banksborrowing rate, and the rmsborrowing rate are
the 3-month T-bill rate, the 3-month CD rate, and the prime lending rate, respectively. The data are from the
Federal Reserve. The sample period is again 1973Q1-2009Q4.
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of .30
Systematic reductions in banking riskiness, i.e., reductions in s, can in principle be brought
about by establishment and improvement of a bank safety net, whereby inter-bank transfers are
undertaken in order to smooth the impacts of bank/region specic productivities. In a given
time period, banks that have low realizations of  are subsidized while those having high
realizations are taxed, with the aggregate net transfer being equal to zero. Over time a bank
is subsidized in periods with low realizations of  and taxed in periods with high realizations.
The e¤ect of improving the bank safety net is equivalent to a systematic reduction in banking
riskiness, which allows the long-run recapitalization rate to be lowed.31 Implementation of the
bank safety net, however, relies on the implicit assumption that the central bank has superior
information regarding realizations of the bank/region specic productivities. Such information
advantage can only be obtained at costs. The better the quality of information, the higher the
costs. Hence complete elimination of the impacts of banking riskiness by the bank safety net
does not seem likely. The recapitalization policy still has a role to play.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Panel (b) of the gure is concerned with the short-run policy in relation to shocks to banking
riskiness. Here s equals 0:031 and  is set to be the corresponding optimal value, i.e., 
 =
1:14%. The left part shows the employment e¤ects (expressed in percent deviations of L from
its steady-state value) of the shock, "t, to banking riskiness. The dashed line corresponds to the
case where there is no reaction of the short-run policy to the shocks (xt equals zero identically).
The solid line corresponds to the case where the short-run policy reacts in the approximately
30For s less than 0:023, all positive values of  are inferior to the zero value.
31 It should be noted that the sort of inter-bank transfers in the bank safety net are di¤erent from the bank
recapitalization policy, which calls for government transfers to all banks in the economy at the same time in our
model.
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optimal fashion described above. As can be seen from the no-reaction line, the e¤ect of a positive
(resp. negative) shock to banking riskiness is to lower (resp. raise) employment. The e¤ects
are asymmetric in that the e¤ects of positive shocks are larger. This is because negative shocks
drive the economy toward the situation without banking frictions, which provides the supremum
for the employment e¤ect. The asymmetry is also evident from the larger marginal employment
e¤ects of positive shocks (the dashed line is steeper to the right of "t = 0). By reacting to
the banking riskiness shocks in the approximately optimal fashion, the short-run policy almost
completely stabilizes employment, as shown by the solid line. The optimal reaction function
is plotted on the right part of Panel (b), where xt turns out be an increasing, approximately
linear function of "t.32 A nal point to notice is that the computation of xt in the gure ignores
the restriction that zt   + xt be nonnegative. This is innocuous as long as the banking
riskiness shock is not too negative. In fact, xt >   whenever "t >  0:07. For "t <  0:07, the
unrestricted xt renders zt negative. However, truncating xt at   or zt at 0 will not produce
much di¤erent outcome since the marginal employment e¤ect of "t is already close to zero in
this region. Nearly complete stabilization can still be maintained.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a general equilibrium framework with banking frictions and two-sided nan-
cial contracting. The framework is used to analyze the e¤ects of bank recapitalization, taking
the form of nominal capital transfers to the banking system. The design of optimal recapital-
ization policy, in relation to the riskiness of banking, is also investigated. The paper contributes
to understanding the transmission mechanisms of the unconventional monetary policy adopted
in the recent nancial crisis, and to understanding how policy should be designed to mitigate
32The approximate linearity obtains since the marginal employment e¤ect of xt is also weaker when the marginal
employment e¤ect of "t is weaker, i.e., when banking is less risky.
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the adverse e¤ects of nancial frictions.
Although our study has mainly concerned the e¤ects of bank recapitalization by the monetary
authority and the analysis has been carried out in a highly stylized model, the theoretical
framework we develop can be extended to study a wide spectrum of issues related to policy and
regulation, as well as the monetary transmission mechanism, in perhaps more realistic ways.
First, nominal rigidities and richer dynamics, such as capital accumulation, can be introduced
to allow for a quantitative assessment of the e¤ects of policy. Second, deposit insurance can
be incorporated in order to study the e¤ects of raising the limit of deposit insurance, as was
implemented in the U.S. in 2008. Third, one can consider situations where some sort of capital
adequacy requirements bind. In those situations, bank recapitalization policy may work through
relaxing these constraints. Fourth, the model can be extended to allow changes in asset prices
to a¤ect the net worth of banks (and rms), as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009). Finally, our analysis can be extended to include credit
rationing as a possible equilibrium outcome as in Williamson (1986) so that another dimension
in which policy exerts inuence on the economy can be explored.33 We conclude that thorough
analysis of frictions in the banking sector should be an integral part of future research on the
interaction of money, nance, and the macroeconomy.
33 In our setup one can imagine two possible types of credit rationing. The rst is rationing on the banks
asset side, where rms are unable to obtain the bank loans they desire. This type of credit rationing has been
extensively studied in the literature (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and Williamson, 1986). The second type is
rationing on the banksliability side, where banks are unable to raise the loanable funds they desire. The latter
type of credit rationing is an interesting aspect to explore in future research.
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Appendix
Derivation of the First-Order Conditions for Problem 1.
To avoid cluttering of notations we omit the arguments, such as
 
!; l

;
 
; r

; and
 
!; 

,
of various functions. We rst show that the rst-order conditions (7)-(10) hold. Let b and d
be the Lagrangian multipliers for (4) and (5), respectively. Then the rst-order conditions with
respect to ! and  are
 f 0 +	b0

b b + d	d

= 0; (A.1)
b b0 + d	d0 = 0: (A.2)
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply
b =   
f 0
	b0
	d0
 b	d0    b0	d ;
d =
 f 0
	b0
 b0
 b	d0    b0	d :
The rst-order conditions with respect to k and l are given by (7) and (8), where
q  
d
 f +	b
 
b b + d	d
 = 	b    f 	b0
 f 0

	d    b	
d0
 b0
 1
;
as in (11). The linear homogeneity of F () together with (7) and (8) imply
PF (k; l) = qR

Rkk +Wl

: (A.3)
At the optimum constraints (4) and (5) both bind. Substituting (A.3) into the equality version
of (4) and (5) yields
q

Rkk +Wl

	b b = N b; (A.4)
q

Rkk +Wl

	b	d = Nd: (A.5)
Dividing (A.5) by (A.4) gives (9). Adding (A.4) and (A.5) and using the equality version of (6)
gives (10).
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We then show that q > 1 for all !;  > 0 and lim!;!0 q = 1. Since
  	d0= b0 < 1 and  	b0= f 0 < 1 for all !;  > 0, we have
q 1 =

	b    f 	
b0
 f 0

	d    b	
d0
 b0

<

 f +	b

 b +	d

< 1;
and hence q > 1 for all !;  > 0. Since lim!0
  	d0= b0 = 1, lim!!0   	b0= f 0 = 1,
lim!0
 
 b +	d

= 1, lim!!0
 
 f +	b

= 1, we have lim!;!0 q
 1 = 1.
Proof of Lemma 1.
To prove dq=db > 0 we rst show that q!
 
!; 
  @q  !;  =@! > 0 and q  !;  
@q
 
!; 

=@ > 0 in the neighborhood of !;  = 0. Let q 1!  @q 1=@! and q 1  @q 1=@. We
obtain from di¤erentiating (11)
q 1! =
 f
 f 02

	b0 f 00  	b00 f 0

	d    b	
d0
 b0

;
q 1

=

	b    f 	
b0
 f 0

 b
 b02

	d0 b00  	d00 b0

:
But 	d    b	d0= b0 > 0, 	b    f	b0= f 0 > 0, and
	d0 b00  	d00 b0 =  r   1  r   "1 + r  
1  r   + 
r0  
r
 

 # ;
	b0 f 00  	b00 f 0 =  l (!)
h
1  l (!)
i "
1 +
!l (!)
1  l (!) +
!l0 (!)
l (!)
#
:
To sign
 
	d0 b00  	d00 b0 we consider two cases. Case 1: lim!0 r   > 0. In this case
lim!0
 
	d0 b00  	d00 b0 =   lim!0 r   < 0. Case 2: lim!0 r   = 0. But Assumption
1(a) requires r () to be positive, bounded, and continuously di¤erentiable on (0;+1). Hence
in this case we must have lim!0 
r0   > 0. This means that for  positive and su¢ ciently
close to 0, we have r
 


> 0 and r0
 


> 0 and hence
 
	d0 b00  	d00 b0 < 0. In both cases
when  is positive and su¢ ciently close to 0, we have q 1

< 0 and hence q > 0. The argument
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is similar for the signs of
 
	b0 f 00  	b00 f 0 and q!. Hence there exist !^ > 0 and ^ > 0 such
that q > 0 and q! > 0 for all
 
!; 
 2 (0; !^) 0; ^.
Next, we have from (9)
d
db
=
 b2
	d0 b  	d b0 > 0:
Given , condition (10), i.e., q	b
 
 b +	d

= f=
 
1 + f

determines !. There can only be
two cases for the change in ! in response to an increase in b and hence . Case 1: ! increases or
stays unchanged. In this case dq=db = q
 
d=db

+q!
 
d!=db

> 0 for
 
!; 
 2 (0; !^)0; ^.
Case 2: ! decreases. In this case 	b decreases, too. In addition
 
 b +	d

decreases with the
increase in . Hence condition (10) implies that q must increase, i.e., dq=db > 0.
We now prove d (q') =db > 0. Note that
d (q')
db
=
dq
db
'+ q
d'
db
=
dq
db
'
"
1 +
q
'
d'
 
!; 

=db
dq
 
!; 

=db
#
:
We need only show that

d'
 
!; 

=db

=

dq
 
!; 

=db

is su¢ ciently close to zero whenever 
!; 

is close to zero. Let '  @'=@ and '!  @'=@!. Since b is a su¢ cient statistic for 
!; 

. It su¢ ces to show lim!;!0
 
'=q

= lim!;!0 ('!=q!) = 0.
To prove lim!;!0
 
'=q

= 0 note that q =  q2q 1 and ' = 	b
 
 b0 +	d0

. We have
q > 0 and ' < 0 for all !;  > 0. Taking limits, we obtain lim!;!0 ' = 0, lim!;!0 q =
  lim!;!0 q 1 , and
lim
!;!0
q 1

= lim
!0

	d0 b00  	d00 b0

since lim!0  
b = lim!0
   b0 = lim!!0   	b0= f 0 = lim!!0   f +	b = 1. Again we
discuss two cases. Case 1: lim!0 
r
 


> 0. In this case lim!;!0 q
 1

=   lim!0 r
 


< 0.
Hence lim!;!0 q > 0 and lim!;!0
 
'=q

= 0. Case 2. lim!0 
r
 


= 0. In this case
lim
!;!0
q 1

'
= lim
!;!0
	d0 b00  	d00 b0
	b ( b0 +	d0)
=1:
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This is because lim!!0	b = 0 and
lim
!0
	d0 b00  	d00 b0
 b0 +	d0
= lim
!0
r
 

 
1  r   1 + r()
1 r() +
r0()
r()

r
 


= lim
!0
"
1

+
r0
 


r
 

 # =1;
which is so since lim!0 
r
 


= 0 implies lim!0 
r0   > 0 by Assumption 1(a). Hence
lim!;!0
 
'=q

= 0 in this case, too. The proof for lim!;!0 ('!=q!) = 0 is similar and is
therefore omitted for brevity.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The left-hand side of condition (25) is a monotonically decreasing function of L, with
limL!0 (1  L) =L = 1 and limL!1 (1  L) =L = 0. For the right-hand side (RHS) both z
and R, which is solely determined by the distribution of z, are taken as given. To see how
RHS depends on L, we consider two intervals separately. For L 2

z
z+(1+z) ; 1
i
, b > 0 since
wL =  (1 + z) L1 L > z. From (28) we have
@b
@L
=


1 + 1 
Kb
K

z (1 + z)nh

1 
Kb
K  (1 + z)  z
i
L+ z
o2 = 0 if z = 0.
Hence b is a monotonic function of L. According to Lemma 1, d (q') =db > 0 when default
rates are su¢ ciently small. Hence in the neighborhood of the zero-default equilibrium, RHS is
a monotonic, positive, nite-valued continuous function of L on

z
z+(1+z) ; 1
i
. Now consider
those values of L 2
h
0; zz+(1+z)
i
. For all these values wL  z and b = 0, implying that RHS is
constant with respect to L, its value being equal to 1 Rq
 
!; 

'
 
!; 

=0
, where ! is given
by (10) with  = 0. This is also the limit of RHS as L tends to zz+(1+z) (meaning that 
b
44
and  both tend to 0) from the right. Hence RHS is a non-increasing, positive, nite-valued,
continuous function of L on [0; 1]. Hence the solution to condition (25) exists, is unique, and is
interior for all z  0, implying that a competitive equilibrium with banking frictions exists and
is unique in the neighborhood of the zero-default equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider rst the starting situation where z > 0 (x >  ). For L 2

z
z+(1+z) ; 1
i
, we have
from di¤erentiating (28)
@b
@z
=
  L1 L

1 + 1 
Kb
K

h

1 
Kb
K  (1 + z)
L
1 L + z
i2 < 0
and hence @RHS=@z < 0. For L 2
h
0; zz+(1+z)
i
we have @RHS=@z = @b=@z = 0. Note that for
all z > 0, 1 Rq'

L= z
z+(1+z)
= 1 Rq (!; 0)' (!; 0) ;where ! is given by (10), with  = 0 and
f = K
b
Kf
+ 1 
K
Kf
. Let z^ be such that
1  L
L

L= z^
z^+(1+z^)
=

1  Rq'

L= z^
z^+(1+z^)
;z=z^
or equivalently
1 + z^
z^
=
Rq (!; 0)' (!; 0)
1   ;
where ! is again given by (10), with  = 0 and f = K
b
Kf
+ 1 
K
Kf
. Obviously such z^ exists and
is unique, positive, and nite. Taking  as given, dene x^  z^   . If   < x < x^ (0 < z < z^),
then 1 LL

L= z
z+(1+z)
=  1+zz >

1 Rq'

L= z
z+(1+z)
, hence the equilibrium L 2

z
z+(1+z) ; 1

.
In this case @RHS=@z < 0, and a marginal increase in z raises equilibrium L. Since in the
neighborhood of the zero-default equilibrium changes in ' are only of second-order importance
as compared to changes in q (and hence L), consumption C = F (K;L)' will also increase in
response to the marginal increase in z. If on the other hand x  x^ (z  z^), then the equilibrium
45
L 2

0; zz+(1+z)
i
. In this case @RHS=@z = 0, and a marginal increase in z has no e¤ect on
equilibrium L and C.
Now consider the starting situation of z = 0 (x =   < x^). We have the equilibrium
L 2 (0; 1) and
@b
@z

z=0
=
 

1 + 1 
Kb
K



1 
Kb
K
2
L
1 L
< 0;
implying @RHS=@zjz=0 < 0. Hence in this situation a marginal increase in z raises equilibrium
L and C.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1. Determination of equilibrium 
 
LHS and RHS refer to the left and right-hand sides, respectively, of condition (25). For RHS, 
R is taken as given. RHS is a horizontal line when z=0 and is kinked when z>0. For given z, 
the equilibrium L is determined by the intersection of LHS and RHS. 
0 1 L 
LHS 
RHS, z=0 
RHS, 0<z<∞ 
RHS, z=∞ 
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(b) 
 
 
Figure 2. Banking Riskiness and the Optimal Recapitalization Policy 
 
Panel (a) pertains to the long-run policy. The left part shows the tradeoff between R and q induced by 
changes in η, with σԕs set to be 0.031. The right part shows the optimal long-run policy, η*, as a 
function of σԕs. Panel (b) pertains to the short-run policy. The left part shows the employment effects 
(percent deviations of L from the steady state) of shocks to banking riskiness, εt. The dashed line 
corresponds to the case where there is no reaction of the short-run policy to the shocks (xt=0 
identically). The solid line corresponds to the case where the short-run policy reacts in an 
approximately optimal fashion. The optimal reaction function is plotted on the right part. 
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